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Abstract 
The special status of flashbulb memories was investigated by contrasting the effects of 
age on the phenomenology and consistency of flashbulb memories of September 11 
over a 2-year delay period with those of a mundane staged control event, learning that 
one had not won a small prize. Flashbulb memories produced no significant age effects 
for either phenomenological characteristics or test-retest consistency, as predicted by 
Mather‟s (2004) emotional compensation hypothesis. By contrast, the control event 
resulted in significant age effects for phenomenological characteristics (e.g., specificity 
and the amount of detail recalled), but not for test-retest consistency. Furthermore, in 
both age groups, memories of September 11 were significantly more vivid, detailed 
and consistent than control memories even though the test-retest interval was twice as 
long for flashbulb memories. In addition, correlations between consistency scores and 
ratings of rehearsal were positive for control memories, but negative for flashbulb 
memories. The theoretical implications of these findings for research on cognitive 
aging and flashbulb memories are discussed.  
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 Effects of age on phenomenology and consistency of flashbulb memories of 
September 11 and a staged control event 
 Memories of personally important and emotionally arousing events are often 
remembered with great clarity and detail for many years (e.g., winning a competition 
or having a car accident) while memories of other, more mundane events, fade over 
time and are easily forgotten. These vivid and long lasting memories are called 
flashbulb memories, and cognitive psychologists have studied them by asking people 
to remember their personal circumstances at the time when they first heard of an 
unexpected and dramatic public event.
1
 A seminal study by Brown and Kulik (1977) 
showed that 13 years after the assassination of John F Kennedy, 99% of north 
American participants were still able to recall at least one of the six basic elements or 
„canonical categories‟ of the context in which they heard the news (the place, activity 
one was engaged in, source of news or informant, own emotion, others emotion and 
immediate aftermath). In order to explain these findings, Brown and Kulik (1977) 
postulated the existence of a special brain mechanism (adopted from Livingston, 
1967), which switches on automatically whenever the levels of surprise and 
importance or consequentiality exceed a certain “threshold‟. This results in a fairly 
detailed and permanent memory trace that is immune to forgetting for many years.  
However, the existence of a „special‟ flashbulb memory mechanism remains 
controversial (M.A. Conway, 1995; Luminet & Curci, 2009; Pezdek, 2003b; Winograd 
& Neisser, 1992). The studies that have addressed this issue have concentrated on two 
separate aspects of flashbulb memories. The first refers to the long-term retention of 
quantity, specificity and vividness of flashbulb memories, irrespective of their 
accuracy (all of which are termed phenomenology in this paper). Research on these 
phenomenological aspects of memory has replicated and substantially extended Brown 
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and Kulik‟s (1977) original findings by showing that people have vivid and detailed 
recollections of the reception context even several decades after the event (Berntsen & 
Thomsen, 2005; Bohannon, Gratz, & Symons Cross, 2007; Tekcan & Peynircioglu, 
2002; see also Kvavilashvili, Mirani, Schlagman & Kornbrot, 2003; Talarico & Rubin, 
2007). The second aspect is the consistency of flashbulb memories, usually assessed by 
comparing participants‟ memories soon after the event with those obtained after a 
delay of several months or years. Research on test-retest consistency of flashbulb 
memories has been more conflicting with some studies showing fairly good (but not 
100%) consistency (e.g., M.A. Conway, Anderson, Larsen, Donnely, & McDaniel, et 
al., 1994; Tekcan, Ece & Gülgöz, 2003), and others substantial forgetting and 
distortions (e.g., Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Schmolck, Buffalo & Squire, 2000). 
In the light of these findings, some researchers have argued that flashbulb 
memories are just ordinary memories that have been preserved by frequent rehearsal 
and media coverage of the event (Neisser, 1982; McCloskey, Wilbe, & Cohen, 1988; 
Talarico & Rubin, 2003; 2007; Wright, 1993). Others believe that for a special status, 
“memories of the personal circumstances of news need neither be complete nor 
immune to forgetting” (p. 56, Larsen, 1992). Instead, one needs to show that flashbulb 
memories are more vivid, detailed and consistent over long time delays than 
autobiographical memories of mundane non-flashbulb events.  
Another important, and equally valid, way of addressing this issue is to 
examine the effects of age. If flashbulb memories are encoded automatically (possibly 
via a „special‟ brain mechanism) and do not require attentionally demanding strategic 
processes, that are known to diminish with aging (Grady & Craik, 2000; Zacks, Hasher 
& Li, 2000), then there should be no age effects in either phenomenological aspects or 
the test-retest scores of young and old adults. The present investigation examines the 
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issue of special status by comparing the effects of age on the phenomenology and 
consistency of memory, over long delay periods, for a flashbulb event of September 11 
(Study 1) and a staged non-flashbulb control event (Study 2). 
Effects of age on flashbulb memories 
The few existing studies on phenomenological aspects of flashbulb memories 
and aging have resulted in conflicting findings. Some studies show reliable age effects 
in the number and/or specificity of the recalled details (Kensinger, Krendl, & Corkin, 
2006; Tekcan & Penircioglu, 2002; Yarmey & Bull, 1978), while others report no age 
effects (Wolters & Goudsmit, 2005; Wright, Gaskell, & O‟Muircheartaigh, 1998). 
Research on test-retest consistency has also been mixed. An early study by Cohen, 
Conway and Maylor (1994) found significant forgetting and distortion in older British 
participants for their memories of the resignation of Margaret Thatcher, after a delay of 
11 months. However, other studies have failed to replicate this finding (A.R.A. 
Conway, Skitka, Hemmerich, & Kershaw, 2009; Davidson, Cook, & Glisky, 2006; 
Davidson & Glisky, 2002; Otani, et al., 2005; but see Kensinger et al., 2006). A study 
by Davidson et al. (2006) is particularly interesting as it used the same test-retest delay 
of 11 months but found no age related deficit in remembering personal circumstances 
of hearing the news of September 11. The authors therefore suggest that “flashbulb 
memories may be different from usual cases of source memory because of their 
emotional content, personal importance, or social relevance” (p. 19).  
 Inconsistent findings could be due to a variety of methodological factors such 
as differences in flashbulb events, sample sizes, scoring methods. For example, the 
resignation of Margaret Thatcher and the explosion of space shuttle Columbia were 
probably not as emotionally arousing/personally significant as the 9/11 terrorist attack, 
hence the significant age effects in the studies of Cohen et al. (1994) and Kensinger et 
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al. (2006) but no age effects in Davidson et al. (2006). Furthermore, several studies did 
not screen older participants and the reported age effects could be due to the inclusion 
of older adults with early stages of dementia (e.g., Kensinger et al., 2006; Tekcan & 
Penircioglu, 2002). Most importantly, all previous test-retest studies have used fairly 
short delay intervals of 6 to 12 months. To assess whether flashbulb memories are 
similar to usual cases of source memory it may be necessary to examine age effects 
with longer delay intervals (cf. Tekcan & Peynircioglu, 2002). To address these issues, 
the current study examined flashbulb memories of September 11 (possibly the most 
tragic event in flashbulb research so far), used a long delay of almost two years and 
thoroughly assessed the cognitive status of participants.  
Comparing flashbulb and non-flashbulb control memories 
In order to properly understand age effects on flashbulb memories, it is also 
crucial to have a truly comparable non-flashbulb control event (cf. Kensinger et al., 
2006). Although there are a growing number of studies that have used control events, 
none are totally satisfactory. Comparisons of reception context to memories of the 
actual event (e.g., factual details of the terrorist attack) are interesting but not entirely 
appropriate as they confound a type of memory (autobiographical vs. semantic)  
(Bohannon, 1988; Bohannon & Symons, 1992; Bohannon, et al., 2007; Er, 2003; 
Nachson & Zelig, 2003; Pezdek, 2003a; Shapiro, 2006; Smith, Bibi & Sheard, 2003; 
Tekcan, Ece, Gülgöz & Er, 2003; Wolters & Goudsmit, 2005).
 2
 The most relevant 
studies have compared flashbulb memories to personal autobiographical memories 
(usually, a self-selected salient event from the week preceding the flashbulb event) 
with mixed results. Some studies show superior consistency of flashbulb memories 
(Christianson, 1989; Curci & Luminet, 2006; Davidson et al., 2006; Tekcan & 
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Peynircioglu, 2002), while others report no reliable differences (Davidson & Glisky, 
2002; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; 2007; see also Kensinger et al., 2006; Weaver, 1993).  
The control events used in these studies have been criticized (Brewer, 1992; 
Larsen, 1992), and Wright and Gaskell (1995) have complained about the lack of 
clarity as to what can count as a good control event in these studies. Personal events 
chosen by participants are different for each participant, both in terms of the event 
contents and its emotional impact. Moreover, these self-selected memories are not 
about the context of hearing the personal news. They are the event itself. Hence, one of 
the major canonical categories of „source‟ (a defining feature of all flashbulb memory 
descriptions, see Neisser & Harsch, 1992, Shapiro, 2006) is not applicable. 
Consequently, Brewer (1992) suggested that a proper comparison should (a) 
involve a control event that asks participants to recall their personal circumstances of 
hearing some mundane personal news, and (b) be the same for all participants. This 
will ensure that the two events are comparable in terms of canonical categories, 
including the source. The present study, to our knowledge, is the first to have used 
such a control event and compared it with a flashbulb event.  
Strategy for this study 
 The present investigation comprises two studies with nearly identical designs. 
The first used a dramatic flashbulb event - the terrorist attack in New York on 
September 11, 2001. The second used a staged non-flashbulb control event from 
participants‟ own personal past. This event was same for all participants and involved 
receiving the news by mobile phone that the participant was not a winner in a prize 
draw run by the experimenter. Using mobile phones ensured that participants would be 
in a variety of locations, as with flashbulb memories.  
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 In both studies, young and old British participants were initially tested either 1-
2 days after the target event (short delay) or 10-11 days after the event (long delay). 
Half of all participants were first re-tested two weeks after their initial test. This 
allowed us to assess the amount of forgetting and age effects, if any, that may have 
occurred between this initial re-test (when memories were fresh) and subsequent re-test 
after a long delay. In Study 1 (flashbulb memory) all participants were finally re-tested 
after a delay of 23-24 months. In Study 2 (control memory) all participants were re-
tested after a shorter delay of 11-12 months. 
Memory was assessed by telephone interview (see Christiansen, 1989; 
Davidson & Glisky, 2002, Davidson, et al., 2006, for a similar procedure), using an 
instrument based on the Flashbulb Memory Questionnaire of M.A. Conway et al. 
(1994). The interview protocol is shown in Table 1. Participants‟ memories were tested 
via both free recall (memory description of personal circumstances) and probed recall 
(answers to canonical questions about time, location, activity, others present and 
source). Consistency of probed recall was assessed by a coding scheme of Neisser and 
Harsch (1992) and their Weighted Attribute Score (WAS) to enable comparisons with 
a large number of previous studies (e.g., M.A. Conway et al., 1994; Cohen et al., 1994; 
Curci & Luminet, 2006; Davidson & Glisky, 2002; Hornstein, Brown , & Mulligan, 
2003; Shapiro, 2006; Schmolk et al., 2000; Smith et al., 2003; Tekcan et al., 2003). 
Hypotheses 
If flashbulb memories are different from ordinary autobiographical memories, 
then the retention of memories of the control event after a shorter delay of 11-12 
months would still be worse than those of flashbulb memories after a longer delay of 
23-24 months. In addition, according to Mather‟s (2004) emotional compensation 
hypothesis “age differences in forgetting and distortion should be greater for the 
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control events than for the shocking events” (p. 289). Therefore, it was predicted that 
age effects, for both phenomenological aspects and test-retest consistency, would be 
obtained for the control event in Study 2, but not for the flashbulb event in Study 1.   
Method 
Overall design 
  The design was between subjects with four independent factors: (1) age of 
participants (young, old); (2) the type of event (flashbulb, control); (3) delay between 
the event and initial testing (short, long), and (4) number of initial tests (one, two). 
Thus, half of the participants were tested only once and half were tested again after two 
weeks from their initial test. All participants were contacted again for a final re-test 
after a delay of two years (flashbulb event) or of one year (control event). Since none 
of the ANOVAs reported in this paper resulted in main effects of delay between the 
event and initial testing and number of initial tests (for details, see Kvavilashvili, 
Mirani, Schlagman, Foley & Kornbrot, in press), or any interactions involving these 
factors (for an exception see Footnote 8), the results will be reported only for the 
variables of age (young, old) and type of event (flashbulb, control). 
 There were three sets of dependent variables (see Table 1): (1) self-rated 
background measures of encoding and rehearsal (surprise, emotion, rehearsal, 
confidence, etc.); (2) phenomenological characteristics of memories irrespective of 
their consistency (the number of canonical items mentioned in free recall, specificity of 
the response to the 5 canonical items in probed recall and vividness on a 10-point 
scale); and (3) memory consistency score (WAS) derived from participants‟ answers to 
the five canonical questions in probed recall at test and re-test. 
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Materials 
 The interview protocols for initial tests and a final re-test are shown in Table 1. 
The free recall and probed recall items were identical to those in the FMQ of M.A. 
Conway et al. (1994; see also Neisser & Harsch, 1992). Background ratings of 
emotion, stress and surprise relevant to encoding were obtained on a 10-point scale on 
all test occasions. Further measures relevant to post encoding, comprising confidence 
for probed and free recall and rehearsal items (also on a 10-point scale) were obtained 
at final re-test.
3
 The FMQ used in Study 2 was identical to that in Study 1 except 
differences in the wording that described the reception event. In addition, the question 
about national importance was dropped as obviously irrelevant.   
Cognitive functioning of participants  
 Participants were screened for cognitive functioning using three tests. The first 
was the Telephone Interview for Cognitive Status (TICS) comprising 11 items with a 
maximum score of 41 and cut off score of 30. TICS correlates highly with the Mini 
Mental Sate Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), and has 94% 
sensitivity and 100% specificity in discriminating patients with Alzheimer‟s disease 
from normal controls (Brandt, Spencer, & Folstein, 1988). The second was the Isaacs 
Set Test (IST) of verbal (category) fluency with a maximum score of 40 (Isaacs & 
Kennie, 1973). The third was a short version of Wechsler Similarities Test (WST) 
(Wechsler, 1981), which requires participants to explain similarities between word 
pairs (e.g., orange–banana) (with maximum score of 10).4  As a result of this screening, 
the data of four old participants in Study 1 and two old participants in Study 2 were 
excluded. Furthermore, none of the participants reported any hearing problems, 
experience of serious head injury, stroke, mental health and/or memory problems 
diagnosed by a physician. All participants had English as a first language.
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The characteristics of participants retained in the final sample are presented in 
Table 2. Old participants had reliably lower scores on at least two cognitive tests than 
young participants, and had spent significantly fewer years in full time education.  
Study 1 (flashbulb memories of September 11) 
 Participants. A total of 168 British participants were tested in September 2001. 
Old participants were recruited from a subject pool of healthy community dwelling 
retired older adults. Young participants were recruited by contacting colleagues, 
relatives and friends of four researchers (first author and 3 research students). Of these, 
135 (80%) were re-tested in summer 2003. After excluding four old participants with 
low scores on cognitive tests, the final sample consisted of 64 young (30 males, 34 
females) and 67 old participants (31 males, 36 females), with the mean ages of 33.41 
years (range 20-56) and 71.31 years (range 61-82), respectively.  
 Procedure. Participants were individually contacted by one of four researchers 








 of September, 2001. 
They were invited to take part in a study examining people’s memories of how they 
first heard the news of a major public event such as the terrorist attack in New York. It 
was explained that participation was voluntary and that a few more interviews could 
follow in subsequent years. After obtaining oral consent, the Flashbulb Memory 
Questionnaire was administered over the telephone (see Table 1). Participants were 
asked to talk slowly and clearly into the phone, which ensured answers could be 
recorded verbatim by the researcher. Each interview lasted between 10 and 20 minutes. 
Half of the participants were re-tested after 2 weeks from this initial interview. They 
were asked to recall the reception event as they remembered it on that day rather than 
trying to remember the answers they gave in the previous interview. All participants 
were finally re-tested, after a delay of 23-24 months, in July/August of 2003. At the 
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end of this interview participants completed three tests measuring their cognitive 
functioning (TICS, IST and WST). 
Study 2 (control memories of a staged event) 
 Participants. A total of 185 participants were recruited and tested in summer 
2003 (89 young and 96 old) through advertising in a local and one national newspaper 
as well as by door-to-door distribution of leaflets. After the exclusion of two old 
participants with low scores on TICS and WST, the final sample in summer 2003 
consisted of 89 young (24 males, 65 females) and 94 old (28 males, 66 females) 
participants with mean ages of 37.72 years (SD=8.08, range 22-50) and 67.3 years 
(SD=5.35, range 60-82), respectively.  Of these 183 participants, 170 (93%) were re-
tested after a period of 11-12 months in summer 2004 (79 young and 91 old).   
Procedure. The study was advertised as a project on memory and aging, which 
required participants to take part in several telephone interviews on their memories of 
personally experienced events. During an initial screening interview, conducted by one 
of the three interviewers (two females and one male), participants were informed that 
in order to take part, they had to own and be familiar with using a mobile phone as they 
would be contacted via their mobile on one or two occasions. They were also informed 
that they had a good chance to win £100 (about $160) within their age group in a prize 
draw that would be shortly run by the research team. To make this prize draw more 
salient, participants were asked if they were happy for their name to be disclosed to 
other participants if they won the draw. This was followed by the three tests assessing 
their cognitive status (TICS, IST, WST). At the end of the interview participants were 
informed that the second interview would be conducted fairly soon (e.g., early next 
week), and were asked to keep their mobiles switched on. They were not informed of 
the exact day and time of this call.  
                                      Effects of Age on Flashbulb and Non-Flashbulb Memories 13 
The following week participants were contacted on their mobile by another 
researcher who informed them that the interview they were expecting had to be 
cancelled, and that the researcher who conducted the initial interview would get in 
touch again soon. Finally, participants were told that the prize draw had taken place 
and that unfortunately they did not win the prize. It was not possible to reveal the 
names of the two winners as they wished to remain anonymous.
5
  
 As in Study 1, half of the participants were contacted after a short delay (1-2 days) 
from receiving the news about the prize draw and half after a longer delay of 10 and 11 
days. Within each group, half of the participants were re-tested after two weeks from their 
initial test. During these interviews the FMQ was used, but participants were asked to recall 
their personal circumstances in which they first heard the news that they did not win the 
prize. All participants were finally re-tested for their memories of the control event in 
summer 2004, approximately 12 months after their initial interview in summer 2003.
6 
Coding the phenomenological characteristics of memories  
 Quantity of details in free recall. The quantity of information provided in 
memory descriptions was assessed in terms of whether participants mentioned any of 
the following categories, out of a possible 10: time, location, activity, others present, 
source of the news, own emotion, others emotion, any preceding events, aftermath and 
any irrelevant/additional detail (cf. Warren & Starwood, 1992). A score of „1‟ was 
assigned if a particular category was mentioned (for example, „in the morning‟, „at 
2:00 p.m.‟ in case of time), and a score of „0‟ if it was not mentioned. Participants were 
only awarded a point for a category if it was explicitly mentioned in the memory 
description, even if they later recalled it as part of a probed recall. The scores could 
range from „0‟ (i.e., no memory of the reception event) to a maximum of „10‟. 
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 Specificity of answers in probed recall. Following Kvavilashvili et al. (2003) 
and Tekcan and Peynircioglu (2002), we used a 3-point scoring system (from „0‟ to 
„2‟) to code the specificity of participants‟ answers to canonical questions about time, 
location, activity, source and others present. A score of '2' was assigned when the 
response contained specific information, for example, a particular radio station (Capital 
FM) in response to a question about the source. A score of '1' was assigned to a 
general, vague response, e.g., “at home” in response to the location question. A more 
specific response (e.g., in my bedroom) was required to get 2 points. „Cannot 
remember‟ or responses preceded by „maybe‟ and „probably‟, were scored as '0'. 
Hence, the maximum possible score for probed recall specificity was 10. 
Coding of test-retest consistency of probed recall (WAS) 
 Following Neisser and Harsch (1992), participants‟ answers to each of the five 
probe questions at a re-test were assigned a score of „0‟, „1‟, or „2‟ depending on how 
consistent they were with the answers provided at the initial test. A score of ‘0’ was 
given if participants could not remember or if they recalled information that was 
completely different from the initial test (e.g., ‘my father’ instead of ‘my friend’). A 
score of ‘1’ was assigned if participants provided either less specific information (‘my 
friend’ instead of ‘my friend Jon’) or slightly incorrect information (e.g., ‘my friend 
Sam’ instead of ‘my friend Jon’). A score of ‘2’ was assigned if participants provided 
either the same information at both tests (e.g., ‘my friend’) or the same information 
plus additional detail at the re-test (initially ‘my friend’ and then ‘my friend Jon’).
7 
 The total consistency score, derived from this coding scheme varies from 0 to 
10. However, according to Neisser and Harsch (1992), location, activity and source are 
the core canonical categories (if one remembers all three one has got a basic story of 
hearing the news), whereas time and others present are the less important attributes of 
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flashbulb memories (see Tekcan et al., 2003 for providing direct empirical support for 
this idea). The Weighted Attribute Score (WAS) reflects this by assigning a maximum 
score of „2‟ for place, activity and source, and giving one bonus point if a participant‟s 
cumulative score for time and others present is 3 or more (out of a total possible 4). 
The WAS ranges from 0 to 7, with higher scores reflecting better consistency. 
Although identical results were obtained for total consistency (0 to 10) and WAS (0 to 
7), only the latter is reported here. 
 All coding of memory consistency and phenomenological qualities was carried 
out by several pairs of independent coders; the percentage of agreement varied from 
85% to 100%, and discrepancies were solved by discussion.    
Results 
Background variables   
Table 3 shows the mean ratings of background variables for young and old 
participants. The upper panel shows initial reactions to the flashbulb and control 
events. The lower panel has post-encoding variables (confidence and rehearsal) at the 
final re-test (delay of 23-24 months for flashbulb and 11-12 months for control event). 
 The data for each variable were entered separately into 2 event (flashbulb, 
control) x 2 age (young, old) between subject ANOVAs. All analyses resulted in a 
significant main effect of event with the flashbulb event being consistently rated as more 
surprising/emotional/important, etc. than the control event. The effect sizes of event 
ranged from medium (=.12) for the ratings of confidence in the free recall at final re-
test (F(1,282)=38.23, MSE=5.08, p<.0001) to very large (=.86) for ratings of surprise 
at initial test (F(1,296)=1766.27, MSE=2.21 , p<.0000001). 
 The only other significant effect was a main effect of age for the ratings of 
personal importance, F(1,297)=4.62, MSE=4.46, p=.03, =.015, with ratings being 
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higher in young (M=3.76, SD=3.06) than in older adults (M=3.14, SD=3.07). There 
was a marginally significant age by event interaction for the ratings of confidence in 
the accuracy of memory descriptions, F(1,282)=3.40, MSE=5.07, p=.066, =.01. 
Thus, there was no age effect for the flashbulb event (F<1), but there was a significant 
effect for the control event (F(1,282)=7.75, MSE=5.07, p=.006, =.027) with older 
adults being more confident (M=7.28, SD=2.71) than younger adults (M=6.28, 
SD=2.68). All other effects were not significant (largest F=2.97). In sum, young and 
old participants did not differ in their ratings of either flashbulb or control event for the 
majority of variables. Also, relative to the terrorist attack in New York, the control 
event satisfies the criteria for being a fairly mundane and trivial event. 
Phenomenological characteristics of memories 
Table 4 shows the means for the three phenomenological variables (quantity of 
recalled information, specificity of participants‟ answers to five questions and 
vividness for the memory of the reception context) which were entered separately into 
a 2 age (young, old) x 2 event (flashbulb, control) x 2 time of testing (initial test, final 
re-test) mixed ANOVAs with the repeated measures on the last factor.  
Quantity of recalled information. The analysis on the number of canonical 
categories mentioned in free recall resulted in main effects of both event and time of 
testing, which were qualified by a significant event by time of testing interaction, 
F(1,297)=60.20, MSE=1.64, p=0001, =.17. Tests of simple main effects showed 
that for the control event, the quantity of free recall dropped significantly from the 
initial test (M=3.44, SD=1.46) to re-test (M=2.33, SD=1.38) (F(1,297)=65.18, 
p<.000001, =.18). By contrast, for flashbulb memories they actually increased from 
M=3.76 (SD=1.51) to M=4.27 (SD=1.72), F(1,297)=10.45, p=.001, =.03 (for similar 
results see Smith et al., 2003). Importantly, the predicted event by age interaction was 
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also present F(1,129)=4.44, p=.04,  2=.02, with no age effect in flashbulb memories 
(F<1), but older adults recalling fewer categories for the control event (M=2.64, 
SD=1.49) than young adults (M=3.15, SD=1.28), F(1,297)=7.71, MSE=1.42, p=.006,  
2
 =.03. 
Specificity of responses to five questions. The ANOVA on the mean specificity 
scores resulted in main effects of event and time of testing, which were again qualified 
by a significant interaction, F(1,297)=73.71, MSE=2.52, p=.0001, =.20. Tests of 
simple main effects showed that for control memories, there was a very large drop in 
specificity from initial test (M=8.41, SD=1.47) to final re-test (M=5.76, SD=2.52), 
F(1,297)=233.75, p<.0000001, =.44. For flashbulb memories, the drop was much 
smaller (from M=8.84, SD=1.04 to M=8.44, SD=1.54), explaining only 1% of the 
variance, F(1,297)=4.06, p=.045, =.01.
8
 The main effect of age was also significant 
(F(1,297)=8.29, MSE=3.67; p=.004,  2 =.03) but was qualified by a marginally 
significant age by event interaction, F(1,297)=3.68, MSE=3.67, p=.056, 2=.01. Thus, 
there was no effect of age in the specificity of flashbulb memories (F<1) but older 
participants‟ memories of the control event were less specific (M=6.73, SD=2.18) than 
those of young participants (M=7.48, SD=1.21), F(1,297)=13.19, MSE=1.84, p<.001, 
2=.04. 
Vividness of memories. The ANOVA on ratings of vividness resulted in main 
effects of event and time of testing which were qualified by a significant event by time 
of testing interaction, F(1,291)=33.13, MSE=3.68, p<.00001, =.10. For control 
memories there was a significant drop in vividness from initial test (M=6.63, SD=2.74) 
to subsequent re-test (M=4.72, SD=2.96) after a delay of only one year  
(F(1,129)=81.02, p<.00001, =.22), while the vividness ratings of flashbulb 
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memories were very high at initial test (M=8.31, SD=1.98) and did not change over a 
delay of two years (M=8.22, SD=1.83) (F<1). No other effects were significant. 
In summary, there were no age effects on the phenomenological characteristics 
of flashbulb memories. All three remained stable over a two-year delay. By contrast, 
there was a reliable drop in phenomenological characteristics of the control event. In 
addition, older adults‟ control memories were less specific and contained fewer 
canonical categories than younger adults‟ memories.  
Test-retest consistency of memories 
To assess the consistency of probed recall, the mean WAS were calculated for 
flashbulb and control events using the scoring system described in the method section. 
These means were entered into a 2 age (young, old) x 2 event (flashbulb, control) 
between subjects ANOVA (see Table 5). There was a significant main effect of event, 
F(1,297)=99.46, MSE=2.79, p<.000001,  =.25. As predicted, the consistency scores 
were significantly higher for the flashbulb (M=5.15, SD=1.60) than for the control 
event (M=3.20, SD=1.73). There was no significant overall effect of age 
(F(1,297)=2.32, MSE=2.79, p=.129,  =.01) or event by age interaction (F<1). Thus, 
contrary to predictions, older adults‟ memories of control event were not reliably less 
consistent (M=3.08, SD=1.88) than those of younger adults (M=3.34, SD=1.53). 
However, consistency scores obtained after delays of 23-24 and 11-12 months 
for flashbulb and control events, respectively, do not allow us to assess the amount of 
forgetting occurring from initial test to final re-test. To address this question we 
calculated additional 2-week WAS consistency measures for the half of the samples 
who were re-tested two weeks from their initial test. The 2-week WAS were calculated 
by comparing responses to five probe questions at initial test with those obtained after 
two weeks.  These „2-week‟ WAS consistency measures and the „final' WAS measures 
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obtained after a delay of 23-24 and 11-12 months were entered into 2 age (young, old) 
x 2 event (flashbulb, control) x 2 time of re-test (2-week, final) mixed ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the last factor. As expected there was a significant main effect of 
event, F(1,140)=33.87, MSE=2.36, p<.00001, =.20, with the flashbulb event having 
overall higher mean consistency scores than the control event. There was also a highly 
significant effect of time of re-test, F(1,140)=191.59, MSE=1.15, p<.0000001, =.58, 
with consistency scores being markedly higher two weeks after initial test (M=6.01, 
SD=1.07) than after a delay of 23-24 or 11-12 months (flashbulb and control events, 
respectively) (M=4.22, SD=1.76). Most important, there was a significant event by 
time of re-test interaction (Figure 1), F(1,140)=14.07, MSE=1.15, p=.0002,  =.09. 
Although consistency of the control event was lower overall than for the flashbulb 
event, the tests of simple main effects showed that this difference was more 
pronounced at the time of final re-test, after a long delay (F(1,140)=34.32, p<.000001, 
 =.20) than after two weeks from the initial test (F(1,140)=11.51, p=.001,  =.075). 
Alternatively, the drop in consistency from initial to final re-test was much sharper for 
the control event (F(1,140)=161.18, p<.0000001, =.54) than for the flashbulb event 
(F(1,140)=48.96, p<.000001,  =.26). There were no other significant main or 
interaction effects (all Fs<2.61). 
Correlation analyses 
Table 6 shows that none of the encoding variables obtained during initial 
testing were correlated with the test-retest consistency scores (WAS) (for similar 
results see Hirst et al., 2009). However, reliable (albeit small) correlations were 
obtained for some post-encoding, background variables at re-test (see lower panel of 
Table 6). In young adults ratings of vividness were positively associated with 
consistency for both flashbulb (r=.25, p<.05) and control events (r=.26, p<.05), and in 
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old adults for the control event (r=.51, p<.001) but not for the flashbulb event (r=.18, 
p=.145). A particularly interesting dissociation emerged between flashbulb and control 
memories for ratings of rehearsal (remembering and/or thinking about one‟s personal 
circumstances). Specifically, while rehearsal was positively correlated with the test-
retest consistency of control memories in both young (r =.26, p<.05) and old 
participants (r =.27, p<.01), this correlation was negative for flashbulb memories of old 
participants (r = –.25, p<.05). In young participants it was also negative (r = –.24) but 
fell just short of significance (p=.059). This means that those who reported rehearsing 
their personal circumstances of hearing the news of September 11 were actually less 
consistent after a delay of two years than those participants who thought about it less 
frequently (see Bohannon & Symons, 1992, who also obtained negative correlations in 
participants who reported being emotionally affected by the news).  
Discussion 
Effects of age on flashbulb and control memories 
Despite a growing number of studies on flashbulb memories in young adults 
(mainly undergraduate students), there are less than a dozen published studies on the 
effects of age on flashbulb memories (see introduction). While some have examined 
only the phenomenological characteristics of memories, others have mainly focused on 
test-retest consistency with delay intervals of 6 to 12 months.
9
 The present aging study, 
to our knowledge, is the first to use a delay as long as 23-24 months and obtain both 
phenomenological and consistency measures for both young and old adults. 
Another key feature of this study is the comparison of age effects on flashbulb 
memories and those of a staged control event that was the same for all participants. In a 
previous aging study with a comparison control event, Davidson et al. (2006) used an 
unspecified (personal) event of participants‟ own choice in the week before the 
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flashbulb event (September 11). They obtained a significant age affect in the 
consistency of memories for the control event but no age effect for September 11. In 
line with this finding, and the emotional compensation hypothesis of Mather (2004), it 
was predicted that significant age effects would be obtained only for memories of the 
control event but not for the flashbulb event. 
Results concerning the flashbulb memories were in line with these predictions. 
Thus, older adults‟ flashbulb memories were as vivid, detailed and specific after a 
delay of two years as those of young adults. In addition, their answers to canonical 
questions were not less consistent over time than those of young adults. This absence 
of age effects in the phenomenology and consistency of flashbulb memories was not 
due to older adults being more affected by the attack, as there were no reliable age 
differences in any of the background variables (see Table 3). Also, the consistency 
scores were by no means at ceiling, which might have masked the presence of age 
effects (Uttl, 2005). Most importantly, the absence of age effects was not due to having 
16 (25%) middle-aged adults (in their 40s and 50s) in the sample of young participants 
in Study 1. Indeed, a separate regression analysis on the flashbulb memory consistency 
scores with chronological age as a predictor did not result in a significant effect of age 
(F(1,129)=1.12, p=.29) (see also A.R.A. Conway et al., 2009). 
Our results conflict with those of Cohen et al. (1994), and Kensinger et al. 
(2006) who found significant age effects for memories of the resignation of Margaret 
Thatcher and the explosion of space shuttle Columbia, respectively. However, they do 
replicate and extend the results of Davidson et al. (2006), who also did not find age 
effects on flashbulb memories of September 11 over a one-year delay period. Non-
significant findings were also obtained in a recent study by A.R.A. Conway et al. 
(2009) that re-tested a large national random sample (N=319) after delays of both one 
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year and two years from September 11. Taken together, these results suggest that if a 
flashbulb event is of sufficient magnitude and importance (as September 11 clearly 
was) then there will be no age effects in the phenomenology and the consistency of 
flashbulb memories over long delays of at least two years. In fact, all our participants 
were re-tested one more time in summer 2004, almost 3 years from September 11, and 
still no age effects emerged either for phenomenological characteristics or test-retest 
consistency (see Kvavilashvili et al., in press).     
 By contrast, findings for the control memories were only partially in line with 
the emotional compensation hypothesis. Thus, as predicted, significant age effects 
were obtained for all phenomenological characteristics of memories except vividness. 
In particular, older adults provided fewer canonical categories in their free recall and 
were less specific in their answers to five probe questions than young adults.
10 
However, no effects of age emerged for the consistency of probed recall – older adults‟ 
control memories (albeit less detailed and specific) were nevertheless as consistent 
after a delay of one year as those of young adults. This finding was unexpected. 
Indeed, laboratory studies of source memory would predict significant age effects in 
the recall of the context of hearing the news of fairly unimportant and non-emotional 
news (see Spencer & Raz, 1995). The absence of age effects for the consistency of the 
control event also contradicts earlier findings of Davidson et al. (2006) who showed 
significant age effects in the consistency of recall of participants‟ self-nominated event 
from the week preceding the flashbulb event. One possible explanation for the absence 
of age effect in the consistency of control memories is that older adults‟ control 
memories were of poorer quality (i.e., less specific and fewer details), so it was easier 
for them to maintain the consistency between poor reports than for younger adults 
whose reports were more detailed and specific.     
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Laboratory research on episodic memory has also shown that age effects can be 
eliminated when older adults have to focus on emotional or socially relevant 
information about the source (e.g., whether it is truthful or not, good or bad) (see May, 
Rahhal, Berry & Leighton, 2005; Rahhal, May & Hasher, 2002) or when they consider 
information as relevant either to them (i.e., self reference effect, see Gutchess, 
Kensinger, Yoon, & Schacter, 2007) or to their everyday knowledge (e.g., Castel, 
2005). It is, therefore, possible that hearing the news of not winning the prize was 
perceived as a self-relevant and somewhat distinctive (albeit unimportant) event, which 
eliminated age effects. Clearly, more research needs to be conducted on laboratory 
source memory tasks with self or social relevance and memories of staged control 
events outside the laboratory. It is particularly important to compare both types of tasks 
in one sample of young and old adults to examine the extent to which the findings from 
laboratory tasks of episodic source memory can be generalized to memories of 
personal autobiographical events (cf. Davidson et al., 2006). 
Are flashbulb memories different from control non-flashbulb memories? 
For both age groups, the consistency was significantly better for September 11 
than for the control event, even though the flashbulb test-retest interval was almost 
twice as long than that for the control event. Moreover, this superior consistency was 
present even after only two weeks from the initial test as shown by the results of those 
participants who were tested twice shortly after the event (see Figure 1). In addition, 
the drop in consistency over a 1-year period was much more dramatic for control 
memories (=.54) than for flashbulb memories over a 2-year period (=.26). All 
these findings support the idea that flashbulb memories are indeed different from 
ordinary non-flashbulb memories. 
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 Further evidence that flashbulb and control memories are qualitatively different 
comes from the comparison of their phenomenological aspects and the results of 
correlational analyses. Thus, irrespective of their consistency, flashbulb memories 
contained more details and were more specific than control memories both at the time 
of initial and final re-tests. Perhaps, the most important finding in this respect refers to 
the ratings of vividness (see Table 4). For flashbulb memories these were very high at 
the initial test and did not reliably decrease after a delay of 2 years (for similar findings 
see Kvavilashvili et al., 2003; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; 2007; Weaver & Krug, 2004). 
For control memories, the ratings were reliably lower than in flashbulbs at initial test 
and substantially decreased after a delay of only 1 year.  
Furthermore, an intriguing and discrepant pattern of correlations emerged in 
flashbulb and control memories for self-rated rehearsal (remembering and/or thinking 
of the reception context). While rehearsal was positively correlated with consistency 
scores in control memories, an opposite trend was present in flashbulb memories – the 
higher the self-rated rehearsal of personal circumstances, the lower the test-retest 
consistency scores. A possible explanation for this negative correlation is that public 
events, such as September 11, are constantly televised and discussed so that each 
person would hear the news several times from different sources (Neisser & Harsch, 
1992). It is possible that over time, people will remember or rehearse several different 
occasions of hearing the news on that day, and this may negatively affect their 
consistency scores for the first reception context. This cannot, by definition, happen 
with the personal control event, hence the positive correlations obtained in Study 2. 
The superior consistency of flashbulb memories, compared with control 
memories, replicates previous findings of Davidson et al. (2006), Christianson (1989) 
and Curci and Luminet (2006), but contradicts the results of Talarico and Rubin (2003; 
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2007) and Kensinger et al. (2006) who did not find reliable differences between the 
consistency of flashbulb and control memories. In most of these studies, control 
memories were of self-selected memorable personal events that happened in the week 
before the flashbulb event. However, in Davidson et al. (2006) participants were 
simply asked to recall this event whereas in studies by Talarico and Rubin participants 
were asked to provide key words which would act as reminders when recalling the 
same event in the future. It is, therefore, possible that participants deliberately 
committed this event to memory for future retrieval, and they were quite successful in 
doing so (see also Weaver, 1993). By contrast, participants in Davidson et al. (2006) 
often could not remember what the personal event was that they described at the initial 
testing. Even when given explicit reminders (e.g., “a party” or “a movie”), their recall 
was poor and reliably worse than for flashbulb memories. There is no doubt that people 
can remember certain events accurately if they deliberately decide to. However, 
flashbulb memories as well as most everyday autobiographical memories are encoded 
incidentally, without any deliberate intention to remember anything. Therefore, 
comparing flashbulb memories with deliberately encoded personal episodes may not 
be an appropriate comparison (for a discussion of this point, see Pillemer, 2009). 
Theoretical implications for cognitive aging research 
Our results showed no age effects in the consistency of either flashbulb or 
control memories. The absence of age effects cannot be attributed to insufficient power 
or ceiling effects in the WAS. The importance of this finding for cognitive aging 
research is emphasized by the reliable age effects, obtained in both studies, in a 
standard laboratory test of immediate free recall of ten words (see Table 2). Table 2 
also shows that older adults had fewer years of education than young adults and scored 
lower on all other cognitive tasks in Study 1 and on category fluency task (IST) in 
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Study 2. In other words, we did not have unusually well-functioning older adults who 
would not display any age effects in other cognitive tasks including a simple episodic 
memory task. 
For flashbulb memories, the findings were predicted from Mather‟s (2004) 
emotional compensation hypothesis and are generally consistent with recent aging 
research on emotional memory showing reduced or no age effects for emotionally 
arousing material (for a review see Kensinger, 2009). Although the absence of age 
effects in the consistency of a staged control event was unexpected, this finding is in 
line with some laboratory studies of episodic memory that have also failed to obtain 
age effects with self-relevant or naturalistic materials (Castel, 2005; Gutchess et al., 
2007). Overall, however, older adults‟ autobiographical memories (whether flashbulb 
or ordinary) appear to be much better retained and more consistent than one would 
predict from numerous laboratory studies of explicit episodic memory including source 
memory tasks (Grady & Craik, 2000; Light, 1991; Zacks, Hasher, & Li, 2000).  
In this respect, interesting parallels can be drawn with developmental research 
on children‟s memory in and outside of the laboratory. For example, Warren and 
Starwood (1992) failed to obtain age effects in the test-retest consistency of 5-to 13-
year old children‟s flashbulb memories of Challenger explosion over a delay of 2 
years. A recent series of test-retest studies of children‟s autobiographical memories of 
traumatic events (an injury and treatment in emergency room), conducted by Peterson 
and her colleagues, also showed few differences between 5- and 13-year old children 
in the consistency of their recall over delays of 6 months to 5 years (see Peterson, 
2002, for a review). The absence of age effects in these studies is in stark contrast to 
very large effects between the ages of 5 and 13 documented in numerous laboratory 
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studies with a variety of explicit episodic memory tasks (see Kurtz-Costes, Schneider, 
& Rupp, 1995; also Gathercole, 1998 for a review).    
Following Rendell and Craik (2000), this contrasting pattern of results in and 
outside the laboratory can be termed the “real-life/laboratory paradox”. In the research 
of these authors on prospective memory (e.g., remembering to do things in the future), 
young adults performed better on typical laboratory tasks  – a consistent finding in 
research on prospective memory and aging (see Henry, MacLeod, Phillips, & 
Crawford, 2004). In contrast, older adults outperformed young participants in everyday 
prospective memory tasks and this advantage was not due to differences in using 
external aids or rehearsal strategies (see also Rendell & Thompson, 1999). In terms of 
their emotional significance the everyday prospective memory tasks were probably 
similar to memories of a staged control event used in the present study. The reasons 
behind the “real-life/laboratory paradox” are not entirely clear (see McDaniel, Einstein, 
& Rendell, 2008). It is possible that studying age effects in flashbulb and staged 
control events will shed some light on mechanisms underlying this intriguing paradox. 
Theoretical implications for flashbulb memory research  
Results of our study appear to contradict the currently popular theory, held by 
Neisser and several other researchers, that flashbulb memories are prone to distortions 
and forgetting like ordinary, non-flashbulb memories (Neisser, 1982; Neisser & 
Harsch, 1992; McCloskey, 1992; Smith et al., 2003; Talarico & Rubin, 2003; 2007; 
Winograd, 1992; Wright, 1993). According to this view, the encoding of flashbulb 
memories is mediated by the operation of the same variables that are responsible for 
preferential encoding of ordinary memories (e.g., novelty, distinctiveness). In addition, 
the long-term retention of these memories is primarily due to high levels of rehearsal 
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of the event and of one‟s personal circumstances that inevitably take place in the delay 
period through extensive media coverage and social sharing of the news.  
 However, the superior consistency of flashbulb memories obtained in the 
present study cannot be explained by increased rehearsal. Indeed, the rates of rehearsal 
(thinking about personal circumstances) were fairly low for both flashbulb and control 
memories on a 10-point scale (M=3.05 and M=1.21, respectively). In addition, while 
rehearsal correlated positively with the consistency scores of control memories, this 
correlation was negative for flashbulb memories (see Table 6). Further evidence in 
support of the idea that retention is not mediated by rehearsal comes from the finding 
that there was no effect of number of initial tests on final consistency scores. Those 
who were tested twice in September 2001 were no more consistent than those who 
were tested only once (see design in method section; for similar results see Hirst et al., 
2009; Hornstein et al., 2003; Shapiro, 2006; Tizzard-Drover & Peterson, 2004; Warren 
& Starwood, 1992). Together, these results suggest that the long-term retention and 
consistency of flashbulb memories are mediated by processes that occur at encoding 
(cf. Kvavilashvili et al., in press). It is, however, unclear whether these involve 
primarily novelty/distinctiveness (Neisser, 1982) or emotional arousal/consequentiality 
(Brown and Kulik, 1977). Normally, the novelty and arousal co-occur in any dramatic 
flashbulb event so it is possible that the superior encoding of flashbulb memories is a 
product of both types of processes. 
Conclusions and future directions 
 Research on aging and autobiographical memory has been based primarily on a 
method in which participants recall their memories in response to word cues or time 
periods suggested by a researcher. Like laboratory studies of episodic memory, this 
research has resulted in significant age effects both in terms of the specificity of 
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recalled memories and their retrieval times (Piolino, et al., 2006; Rubin & Schulkind, 
1997; Schlagman et al., 2009). However, very little is known about age effects in long-
term retention and consistency of individual autobiographical memories (whether 
emotional or mundane). Results of the present study begin to fill this gap by showing 
that there are definitely no age effects in the specificity and consistency of 
autobiographical memories of emotionally arousing events over delay intervals as long 
as two or even three years (see also Kvavilashvili et al., in press). The next stage would 
be to examine even longer delays of 5 to 10 years. Findings concerning memories of a 
staged control event are also novel and theoretically informative. Although older adults 
had less detailed and specific memories for the control event than young participants 
after a delay of one year, their performance was not at floor and there were no age 
effects in the consistency of these memories. Thus, the effects of aging on source 
memory for control as well as flashbulb events merits further investigation. 
 The absence of age effects in the consistency of flashbulb and control 
memories also suggest that, in everyday life, most autobiographical memories are 
probably encoded automatically without one deliberately trying to encode or remember 
them. However, while memories of ordinary events are forgotten relatively quickly, 
flashbulb memories can be retained and show fairly good consistency for at least 2 to 3 
years (present study; Kvavilashvili et al., in press). Various models of flashbulb 
memories have suggested that the emotional impact and personal importance of the 
event are crucial factors that contribute to the encoding and retention of flashbulb 
memories (see Luminet, 2009, for overview). However, correlations between these 
variables and flashbulb memory measures are usually fairly modest and several 
studies, including the present one, have failed to obtain reliable correlations (e.g., Curci 
& Luminet, 2006; Davidson & Glisky, 2002; Hirst et al., 2009; Neisser & Harsch, 
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1992; Otani et al., 2005; Shapiro, 2006; Smith et al., 2003). This could be due to 
ceiling effects in participants‟ ratings and/or the unreliability of measurement scales 
ratings. Future research might adopt an experimental approach by manipulating the 
emotional impact and personal importance of a staged control event and studying their 
effects on consistency over long delays. Whatever the outcome of these studies, one 
thing that is clear from the results of the present study is that “it would be premature to 
equate them [flashbulb memories] with memories of the multitude of mundane and 
recurring events in our lives” (p. 137; Pillemer, 2009).  
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Footnotes 
1 
This ensures some control over a flashbulb inducing event (i.e., same for all participants) 
even though the reception context in which the news was first heard varies across 
participants (Wright, 1993). 
2 
Interestingly, the majority of these studies have found that retention levels of flashbulb 
memories are reliably better than for the factual details of the event memory (but see Er, 
2003, Nachson & Zelig, 2003, and Bohannon et al., 2007, who obtained different results). 
3 
Due to experimenter error, ratings of personal and national importance of terrorist attack 
in New York were obtained only at final retest in summer 2003.  
4
 The IST and WST were used as screening tests because in the study of Rouch-Leroyer, 
Fabrigoule, Lettenneur, Commenges, Orgogozo and Dartigues (1998), 18.5% of older 
adults, who scored below the cut off points on both of these tests (less than 25 on IST and 
less than 6 on WST), were diagnosed with dementia after two years. 
5 
In reality, the prize draw could not be run at this early stage of the project, while we were 
still in the process of recruiting participants. However, this bogus information was crucial 
for the design of the study as it allowed us to create a situation in which all participants 
received the same personal news about a less surprising and unimportant mundane event 
(i.e., not winning the prize). The real prize draw was run only after the entire study was 
completed in summer 2004. 
6
 Participants also had an additional interview on their memories of September 11 and the 
death of Princess Diana in summer 2003 and in summer 2004. Results from these 
interviews are not reported in this study. 
7 
Method of scoring was identical for flashbulb and control memories except for 
participants’ answers to a question about source. Because most participants in Study 2 
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remembered correctly that they heard it from the phone conversation, we also asked them to 
tell us whether the informant was male or female. Only when they could answer this 
question correctly at re-test would they be assigned a maximum score of ‘2’.  
8 
It is important to note that this effect for flashbulb memories was in fact due to a 
statistically reliable decrease in specificity scores in only one of the eight original  
experimental groups - older adults who were initially tested 10-11 days after the event (long 
delay condition) and were not re-tested after two weeks (tested once) (see design section in 
method).  
9 
A.R.A. Conway et al. (2009), is the only aging study that used a 2-year delay interval but 
they also had an initial re-test after 11 months. In addition, the study used a somewhat 
unusual methodology, an internet survey with fixed response options, which could have 
inflated the consistency scores, and makes the comparisons with other studies difficult. 
10 
This is in line with the research on aging and autobiographical memory which shows that 
older adults recall less specific and detailed memories in response to time-period or word 
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Table 1 
Telephone Interview Protocol 
Flashbulb Memory Questionnaire at initial test (all participants) and at initial re-test 
(half the participants) 
Question Measure Classification 
Type of 
Variable 
Please give a brief but detailed 
description of the personal 
circumstances in which you first heard 
the news 
Flashbulb: of the terrorists' attack in 
New York on 11 September 
Control: of not winning a prize  
Number of canonical 







When did you first hear the news? 
Specificity of the 
response 
   
 
 











Where were you when you heard the 
news?  
Were there other people with you? If 
yes, then provide their names. 
What were you doing at the time when 
you heard the news? 
Who or where did you hear the news 
from? 
How emotional was your first reaction 
to the news? 
Please answer on a 10- point rating 
scale where 1 is "Very calm, not 






How surprised were you to hear this 
news? 
Please answer on a rating scale where 1 
is "Not surprised at all" and 10 is 
"Extremely surprised". 
Surprise Encoding 
How stressed did you feel later on in 
the day after you heard the news? 
Please answer on a rating scale where 1 





How often have you been thinking 
about  
Flashbulb: the terrorists' attack in New 
York on 11 September? 
Control: not winning a prize? 
Please answer on a rating scale where 1 
is "Not at all" and 10 is "all the time". 
Rehearsal Post-encoding 
How vivid is your memory of 
circumstances in which you first heard 
the news? 
Please provide an answer on a rating 
scale on which 1 is "no image at all" 
and 10 is "extremely vivid image, 
almost like normal vision". 
Vividness Phenomenology 
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Table 1 (continued) Additional questions asked at final re-test (all participants) 
 
Question Measure Classification Type of 
Variable 
How confident are you that you 
remember this correctly? 
Please answer on a rating scale where 1 
is "Merely guessing, not confident" and 













When you first heard the news how 
important was if for you personally? 
Please answer on a rating scale where 1 









How important was the news of the 
terrorist attack considered in the UK? 
Please answer on a rating scale where 1 










How often have you been thinking or 
being reminded of  
Flashbulb: the terrorist attack in New 
York in the past two years? 
Control: not winning the prize in the 
past year? 
Please answer on a rating scale where 1 
is "Never" and 10 is "Very often, at least 






6 How often have you been remembering 
or thinking of your personal 
circumstances in which you heard the 
news of  
Flashbulb: the terrorist attack in the 
past two years? 
Control: not winning the prize in the 
past year? 
Please answer on a rating scale where 1 
is "Never" and 10 is "Very often, at least 








Note 1. Memory questions, as in M.A. Conway et al. (1994). 
Note 2. Background questions, as in M.A. Conway et al. (1994), but 10-point not 3-
point scales. 
Note 3. Additional background questions, not presented in M.A. Conway et al. (1994).  
Note 4. Confidence rating was asked after free recall and after all 5 probe questions. 
Note 5. Importance questions asked at initial test by M.A. Conway et al. (1994) but in 
final re-test interview here. 
Note 6. Post encoding rehearsal questions modified from M. A. Conway et al. (1994). 
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Table 2 
Mean Scores (Standard Deviations) on Tests of Cognitive Functioning and Mean 
Number of Years of Education as a Function of Age in Study 1 and Study 2.  Right 
Hand Columns Present Results of One-Way ANOVAS with Age Group as Independent 
Variable (F Values and Effect Sizes). 
Age  Group 
     Young       Old F value Partial  
(eta-squared) 
 
(a) Study 1 
 
     N=64 
 







TICS 35.63  (1.98)  34.79  (1.88)   6.12*      .04 
 
Recall of 10 words 
(TICS – Item 5) 
  6.02  (1.28)  
  
  5.12   (1.88) 15.70***      .11 
IST 
 
36.86  (2.84) 34.39  (4.06) 16.12***      .11 
WST 
 
  7.70   (.61)   6.96  (1.55) 12.96***      .09 
Education 
 
17.60  (4.26) 13.29  (3.61) 38.93****      .23 
 
(b) Study 2 
      
     N=79 
     







35.47 (2.25) 35.08 (1.96)   1.47      .01 
Recall of 10 words 
(TICS – Item 5) 
  6.03 (1.38)              5.20 (1.42) 14.73***      .08 
IST 
 
37.62 (2.37)             36.77 (3.18)   3.83*      .02 
WST 
 
  7.66 (.89)               7.47 (.96)   1.70      .01 
Education 
 
16.46 (2.83)             14.89 (3.40) 10.45**      .06 
* p≤.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001; **** p<.0001 
Note. TICS – Telephone Interview of Cognitive Status (Brandt, et al., 1988); IST – 
Isaacs Set Test (Isaacs & Kenny, 1973); WST – Wechsler Similarities Test (Wechsler, 
1981). 
 
                                      Effects of Age on Flashbulb and Non-Flashbulb Memories 45 
Table 3 
Mean Ratings of Young and Old Participants’ Initial Reactions to the Event (Panel A) 
and Post-Encoding Variables at Re-Test (Panel B) as a Function of Event (flashbulb 
vs. Control). Standard Deviations in Brackets.  
                                                        Flashbulb Event                      Control Event 
 
     Young 
    
      Old 
   
   Young 
 
      Old 
 
 
 Ratings of initial reactions 
 




4.79  (2.32)  
  
4.95  (2.71)    1.42 (.79)   1.09 (.32) 
Stress 
 
6.13  (2.54) 6.02  (2.57)    1.10 (.52)   1.04 (.33) 
Rehearsal of event itself 
 
7.34  (1.98) 7.27  (1.81)    1.47 (.64)   1.43 (.67) 
Importance (personal) 
 
6.30  (2.52) 5.66  (3.21)   1.70 (1.54)   1.29 (.82) 
Importance (national) 
 
8.91  (1.19)              8.54 (1.43)     N/A      N/A 
 
Ratings of post-encoding variables 
 
Confidence in free recall 
 
8.43  (1.46)             8.45 (1.64)   6.28 (2.68)   7.28 (2.71) 
Confidence in probed recall 
 
8.84  (.86)               9.05  (.99)   7.60 (1.59)   7.82 (1.66) 
Rehearsal of event itself 
 
5.73  (1.89)             5.69  (1.78)   1.12 (.40)   1.17 (.49) 
Rehearsal of personal 
circumstances 
2.81  (1.46) 3.28  (1.94)   1.20 (.65)   1.23 (.60) 
 
Note. All ratings were made on 10-point rating scales (see Table 1). 
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Table 4 
Means of Phenomenological Variables as a Function of Age (Young, Old), Type of 
Memory (Flashbulb vs. Control) and Testing Occasion (Initial Test vs. Final Re-Test) 
(Standard Deviations in Brackets).  
                                                                 Type of memory     
 
                                                          Flashbulb 
 
           Control 
     Young 
    
      Old 






Number of categories in free recall 
 
At initial test  
 
3.55  (1.28)               3.97 (1.68)   3.63 (1.31)    3.27 (1.56) 
At final re-test 
 
4.41  (1.50)             4.13  (1.91)   2.66 (1.25)    2.00 (1.42) 
 
Specificity of probed recall 
      
At initial test 
  
8.89  (1.04) 8.79 (1.05)   8.76 (1.19)   8.10 (1.63) 
At final re-test 
 
8.55 (1.39)             8.34 (1.66)   6.22 (2.19)   5.36 (2.73) 
 
Ratings of vividness of reception context 
   
At initial test 8.05  (1.97)  8.55  (1.97)   6.86 (2.41)  6.43 (2.99) 
 
At final re-test 
 
8.16  (1.62)  
  
8.28  (2.01)   4.96 (2.82)  4.51 (3.08) 
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Table 5 
Mean Probed Recall Consistency Scores (Weighted Attribute Scores) at Re-Test as a 
Function of Age (Young, Old) and Type of Memory (Flashbulb vs. Control). Standard 
Deviations in Brackets. 
                                                                  Age  Group 




           5.31  (1.43) 
 




           3.34  (1.53) 
  
        3.08  (1.88) 
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Table 6 
Pearson Product Moment Correlations Between Memory Consistency (Weighted 
Attribute Scores) and Self-Rated Background Variables at Initial Test and at Final Re-
Test as Function of Age (Young vs. Old) and Type of Memory (Flashbulb vs. Control).  
                                                     Study 1 (Flashbulb)                Study 2 (Control) 
     Young 
    (N=64) 
      Old 
    (N=67) 
  Young 
 (N=79) 
   Old 
(N=91) 
 
Correlation betweens WAS and variables at initial test 
 




      .16 
  
      .00      .00      .03 
Stress 
 
      .15       .12      .04     -.08 
Rehearsal of event itself 
 
     -.06       .00      .15      .18 
 
Correlation between WAS and variables at final re-test 
      
Importance (personal) 
 
     -.08      -.24       .09      .14 
Importance (national) 
 
     -.02      -.16        –       – 
Confidence in probed recall 
 
      .08       .22       .07      .21 
Vividness of memory       .25* 
 
      .18       .26*      .51*** 
Rehearsal of event itself 
 
      .09      -.16       .04      .23* 
Rehearsal of personal  
circumstances  
     -.24      -.25*       .26*      .27** 
Note. * P <.05,  ** P <.01,  *** P <.001 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Mean Consistency Scores (WAS) as a Function of Event (Flashbulb vs. 
Control) and Time of Re-Test (2-Week vs. Final) in Participants Who Were Initially 


























Figure 1  
